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THE ABANDONED WARDS OF ADMIRALTY: THE
S PREME CO R S CO RSE CHANGE ON THE
AVAILABILITY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES TO SEAMEN
IN UNSEAWORTHINESS CLAIMS
Hillary Smith Weise*
Abstract: This Comment compares Dutra Group v. Batterton and Tabingo v. American
Triumph LLC, two significant but contradictory admiralty decisions on the availability of
punitive damages in unseaworthiness claims. It argues that the Washington State Supreme
Court s decision in Tabingo that punitive damages should be permissible in unseaworthiness
claims is far better from both policy and doctrinal standpoints. From a doctrinal perspective,
maritime law has traditionally permitted punitive damages in admiralty cases. Therefore, it
would have been more appropriate for the Court to adhere to the principle that it is better to
allow a remedy in admiralty proceedings so long as an inflexible rule does not prohibit it. From
a policy standpoint, employers do not require the same protections as seamen.
This Comment also analyzes how the United States Supreme Court in Batterton confirmed
its unwillingness to use its explicit grant of admiralty jurisdiction by rejecting an admiralty
remedy because such remedy was not explicitly provided for by Congress. Batterton also
reflects the Supreme Court s shift from considering seamen the wards of admiralty to stating
there is no longer any policy need to protect them. The Court abandoned the nearly 200-yearold determination for a weak policy argument with little explanation. The stark implication
flowing from this decision is that a cost-benefit analysis for employers now makes it cheaper
to kill seamen than to make them sick.

* J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2021. I would like to thank
Professors Craig Allen and Hugh Spitzer for their valuable guidance throughout the drafting process.
I would also like to thank the Washington Law Review editorial staff for their insightful edits and
support. The author is an officer in the U.S. Coast Guard. The views expressed herein are those of the
author and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of the Commandant or of the
U. S. Coast Guard. The External Affairs Manual, COMDTINST M5700.13, Chapter 6.
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From now on, the occasional employer delinquent in paying
hospital bills will receive heavy punishment, while the occasional
shipowner supplying recklessly and outrageously an unsafe ship
that causes the death of one or more seamen will do so with
impunity, while laughing all the way to the bank, paying only the
relatively minor pecuniary damages that could be proven. The old
joke of the pre-Moragne era maintains its macabre humor. It is
still cheaper to kill them than to make them sick. 1
INTRODUCTION
A common adage among sailors is one hand for yourself, one hand for
the ship. 2 Sailors hear many phrases like this daily a constant reminder
of the dangers of working at sea. Sailors train relentlessly to minimize
these dangers and, as the United States Coast Guard Academy motto
explains, the sea
ields to knowledge. 3 Unfortunately, the
seaworthiness of the vessels that seamen4 work on is not completely
within their control. Seamen can bring a claim of unseaworthiness if they
get injured as a result of the vessel. A seaman s unseaworthiness claim
stems from injuries suffered due to a vessel owner s failure to furnish a
vessel and appurtenances reasonabl fit for their intended use. 5 No matter
how much knowledge sailors gain in seamanship, navigation, and damage
control, they are still subject to the limitations of the vessels they sail on
and the crew members they sail with.
Allan Tabingo was a deckhand trainee aboard a fishing trawler.6 He
was on his hands and knees sweeping the final fish through a hatch below
deck when his fellow crew member started to close the hatch.7 Though the
1. Attilio Costabel, Punitive Damages in Unseaworthiness. The Lawmaker Giveth, The Lawmaker
Taketh, 50 J. MAR. L. & COM. 313, 329 (2019) (emphasis omitted).
2. TRISTAN JONES, ONE HAND FOR YOURSELF, ONE FOR THE SHIP (1990).
3. Facilities, COAST GUARD ATHLETIC ACTIVITY FUND, https://uscgasports.com/information/fac
ilities [https://perma.cc/ATW6-LK2W].
4. The term seaman is used throughout this Comment instead of a gender-inclusive term like
seafarer because seaman status is a term of art in Admiralty Law. Seamen derive special protections
from establishing that status in accordance with case law and statutes. Seaman status is a nuanced
area of Admiralty Law that is beyond the scope of this Comment. See Carlos Felipe Llinás Negret,
Sea Worthy: To Protect Seafarers, Congress and the Federal Courts Have Created a Strong Set of
Common Law Rights and Privileges, 37 L.A. LAW. 34 (2014).
5. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960).
6. [A] large conical net dragged along the sea bottom in gathering fish or other marine life.
Trawl, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/trawling
[https://perma.cc/3D9R-J794]; Tabingo v. Am. Triumph LLC, 188 Wash. 2d 41, 44, 391 P.3d 434,
436 (2017).
7. Tabingo, 188 Wash. 2d at 44, 391 P.3d at 436.
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crew member realized his mistake and attempted to stop the hatch from
closing, its control handle was broken.8 The hatch closed on Tabingo s
hand and he suffered severe injuries, including the amputation of two
fingers.9 Similarly, Christopher Batterton was a deckhand aboard a
scow.10 While working in navigable waters, his fellow crew members
erroneously pumped pressurized air into a compartment.11 This caused the
hatch12 cover to blow open and crush Batterton s hand between the hatch
and the bulkhead.13 His hand was permanently disabled from the
accident.14 Both seamen s injuries were the subject of major admiralt
suits: Dutra Group v. Batterton,15 a United States Supreme Court case
decided in June 2019,16 and Tabingo v. American Triumph LLC,17 a
Washington State Supreme Court case decided in March 2017.18
Although these cases presented a variety of claims, the highest court in
each case ultimately only considered the pleas for punitive damages due
to the unseaworthiness of the vessels.19 The Washington State Supreme
Court held in Tabingo that a plaintiff may recover punitive damages on a
claim of unseaworthiness.20 However, that decision was overruled by the
Supreme Court s holding in Batterton that a plaintiff may not recover
punitive damages on an unseaworthiness claim.21 Batterton and Tabingo
arrived at opposite conclusions by relying on different cases Miles v.

8. Id. Allegedly American Seafoods was aware of the broken handle for two years prior to the
accident. Id.
9. Id.
10. [A] large flat-bottomed boat with broad square ends used chiefly for transporting bulk material
(such as ore, sand, or refuse).
Scow, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/scow [https://perma.cc/J95G-5ULK]. Dutra Grp. v. Batterton, __ U.S. __,
139 S. Ct. 2275, 2282 (2019).
11. Batterton, 139 S. Ct. at 2282.
12. [A]n opening in the deck of a ship. Hatch, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/hatch [https://perma.cc/8GW4-NSHB].
13. Batterton, 139 S. Ct. at 2282. [A]n upright partition separating compartments.
Bulkhead, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bulkhead
[https://perma.cc/3AZ7-M6E8].
14. Batterton, 139 S. Ct. at 2282.
15. __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2275 (2019).
16. Id. at 2275.
17. 188 Wash. 2d 41, 391 P.3d 434 (2017).
18. Id.
19. Batterton, 139 S. Ct. at 2282; Tabingo, 188 Wash. 2d at 44, 391 P.3d at 436.
20. Tabingo, 188 Wash. 2d at 43, 391 P.3d at 436.
21. Batterton, 139 S. Ct. at 2278. This decision is striking, given that Washington is one of the few
states that does not regularly award punitive damages. Tabingo, 188 Wash. 2d at 52, 391 P.3d at 440.
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Apex Marine Corp.22 and Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend,23
respectively. This Comment explores how Batterton and Tabingo applied
these precedents to reach differing conclusions. This Comment argues that
punitive damages in unseaworthiness claims should be allowed, from both
a doctrinal and policy standpoint.
This Comment proceeds in three Parts. Part I provides an overview of
general maritime law. It discusses the sources of general maritime law,
remedies available to seamen, and the history of seamen as the wards of
admiralty. Part II compares Batterton and Tabingo. It explores the
reasoning and conclusions of those cases. Finally, Part III analyzes why
Tabingo is a stronger case from both a doctrinal and policy standpoint. It
offers a critique of the Batterton Court s misguided shift in admiralt
decision making. Batterton illustrates the Supreme Court s unwillingness
to allow an admiralty remedy that is not expressly authorized by Congress
despite acting as a common law court sitting in admiralty.24 Batterton also
reflects the Court s move awa from its 200-year-old jurisprudence that
considered seamen the wards of admiralty.25 The Court stated that it no
longer saw a policy need to protect seamen.26 Ultimately, this Comment
concludes that the Batterton Court should have adhered to the principle
that if there is no evidence Congress has sought to restrict a remedy, and
such remed does not conflict with Congress s pursuit of uniformit in
the exercise of admiralt jurisdiction, then such a remedy should
be permitted.27
I.

OVERVIEW OF GENERAL MARITIME LAW

The Constitution implicitl directs federal courts to preside over
admiralty cases in the manner of a common law court. 28 If Congress is
silent on a matter, the federal courts establish the amalgam of traditional
common-law rules, modifications of those rules, and newl created rules
22. 498 U.S. 19 (1990).
23. 557 U.S. 404 (2009).
24. [This Court] cannot sanction a novel remed here unless it is required to maintain uniformit
with Congress s clearl expressed policies, particularl those in the Merchant Marine Act of 1920
(Jones Act), which codified the rights of injured mariners and incorporated the rights provided to
railwa workers under the Federal Emplo ers Liabilit Act (FELA). Batterton, 139 S. Ct. at 2278,
2281.
25. Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480, 485 (C.C. Me. 1823) (No. 6,047).
26. Batterton, 139 S. Ct. at 2287.
27. Miles, 498 U.S. at 26.
28. Batterton, 139 S. Ct. at 2278 (quoting Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 489 90
(2008) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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that forms the general maritime law. 29 However, the courts must respect
Congress s persistent pursuit of uniformit in the exercise of admiralt
jurisdiction. 30 This balancing act has created tension regarding how
much weight Congress has in the creation of admiralty law versus the
common law admiralty courts.31 Without congressional guidance, courts
have struggled to adapt admiralty law to the modern age of seafaring, to
come to a consensus on how much protection to give seamen, and to
determine the modern arc of admiralty law.
A.

The Sources of General Maritime Law

The United States Constitution s Admiralt Clause states that [t]he
judicial Power shall extend . . . to all Cases of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction. 32 The Clause empowers Congress to grant the District
Courts maritime jurisdiction. 33 Congress exercised this power through the
enactment of section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.34 Thus, federal courts
are empowered by the Admiralty Clause to develop the general maritime
law.35 While federal courts can develop this law, the Admiralty Clause
also grants Congress the authority to enact statutes setting the limits of
maritime law, and b extension, the federal courts powers in
admiralty cases.36
If a statute and the general maritime law conflict in an admiralty case,
then deference is given to the statute.37 However, there is a rising trend
29. Id. (quoting E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 864 65 (1986)).
30. Id. (quoting Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 401 (1970)).
31. Id. at 2278 79.
32. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
33. Romero v. Int l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 360 (1959).
34. Id. at 361 (1959). Congress gave the District Courts exclusive original cogni ance of all civil
causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction . . . saving-to-suitors, in all cases, the right of a
common law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it . . . . Judiciary Act of September
24, 1789, c. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 76 77 (amended 1949). This grant of jurisdiction is now codified at 28
U.S.C.A. § 1333.
35. Yamaha Motor Corp., USA v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 200 (1996). The general maritime law
is also referred to as the federal maritime law. Id.
36. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215 (1917). (1) It empowered Congress to confer
admiralt and maritime jurisdiction on the Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court which were
authorized by Art. I. § 8, cl. 9. (2) It empowered the federal courts in their exercise of the admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction which had been conferred on them, to draw on the substantive law inherent
in the admiralt and maritime jurisdiction, . . . and to continue the development of this law within
constitutional limits. (3) It empowered Congress to revise and supplement the maritime law within
the limits of the Constitution. Romero, 358 U.S. at 360 61.
37. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 27 (1990) ( Congress retains superior authority in
these matters, and an admiralty court must be vigilant not to overstep the well-considered boundaries
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among federal courts toward complete deference.38 Complete deference
in this context means that the court declines to develop the general
maritime law even if Congress is silent.39 As one scholar noted, [t]he
general maritime law of the United States a body of general, judgemade law developed from centuries-old transnational customary legal
principles appears to be slowl but steadil on its wa out. 40 Many
admiralty experts have expressed concern about the implications of this
shift on how admiralty cases will be decided.41
Miles v. Apex Marine Corp, decided in 1990, is an example of the
complete deference approach.42 In Miles, the mother of a seaman brought
a suit against the owners of a vessel after her son was repeatedly stabbed
and killed by a fellow crew member.43 The United States Supreme Court
held that she could not recover loss of society damages44 for the wrongful
imposed b federal legislation. ).
38. See Michael Sevel, Lost at Sea: The Continuing Decline of the Supreme Court in Admiralty, 71
U. MIAMI L. REV. 938, 938 (2017) ( For the first 200 ears of its histor , the United States Supreme
Court served as the primary leader in the development of, and its cases the primary source of, the
admiralty and maritime law of the United States. That appears to be changing. The Court's admiralty
cases over the last quarter century indicate that it is slowly giving up its traditional leading role in
creating and developing rules of admiralty law, and instead deferring to Congress to make those rules,
a trend that is tantamount to abandoning its Article III constitutional duty to serve as the country's
onl national admiralt court. ).
39. See John R. Brown, Admiralty Judges: Flotsam on the Sea of Maritime Law?, 24 J. MAR. L. &
COM. 249, 284 (1993) ( As Justice Stor concluded, even a strong implication b Congress is
insufficient to deprive admiralty judges of their duty to enunciate the law in conformity with
governing maritime principles. Only an express prohibition by Congress can serve to deny admiralty
judges the power to declare admiralt law which was delegated to them b the Constitution. ).
40. Michael Sevel, Lost at Sea: The Continuing Decline of the Supreme Court in Admiralty, 71 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 938, 941 (2017) (emphasis in original).
41. See, e.g., David W. Robertson, Summertime Sailing and the U.S. Supreme Court: The Need for
A National Admiralty Court, 29 J. MAR. L. & COM. 275, 303 04 (1998) (characterizing the current
state of admiralty litigation as a mess and arguing a High Court of Admiralt would better serve
maritime law consumers in the United States); John R. Brown, Admiralty Judges: Flotsam on the Sea
of Maritime Law?, 24 J. MAR. L. & COM. 249, 249 (1993) (arguing the Supreme Court justices had
abandoned their role as admiralty judges and had become followers rather than leaders by refusing to
enunciate maritime law and always looking to Congress); Lee A. Handford, Do Not Fear to Tread on
Solid Ground: The Role of the Supreme Court in Furthering Uniformity in Admiralty Law, 10 U.S.F.
MAR. L.J. 235, 275 (1999) (arguing the Supreme Court should begin its analysis when creating law
with the assumption that the Supreme Court is the primar proponent of federal admiralt law ).
42. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990).
43. This case presented a particularly horrendous set of facts in that Ludwick Torregano, a twentyfour-year-old seaman, was stabbed at least sixty-two times by the chief cook while their ship was
docked in Vancouver, Washington. See Miles v. Melrose, 882 F.2d 976, 980 (5th Cir. 1989).
44. In this case, the decedent s mother, in her individual capacit , sought recover for her son s
wrongful death, including damages for loss of financial support and services from her son and for
loss of societ . . . . The term societ embraces a broad range of mutual benefits each famil
member receives from the others continued existence, including love, affection, care, attention,
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death of her son due to the unseaworthiness of the ship.45 The Court chose
to limit the plaintiff s remedies because a claim was also brought for
negligence under the Jones Act.46 The Court concluded that maritime tort
law was dominated b federal statute and it did not want to exceed the
Jones Act s limits on recover in survival actions.47 The uniformity
principle derived from Miles established that if a statute did not allow
particular damages then a similar general maritime law claim could not
allow them.48 Even though Miles did not discuss punitive damages, some
lower courts have expanded upon this decision to preclude seamen from
recovering punitive damages in any cause of action.49
Nearly twenty years later in Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend, the
Court did not use the complete deference approach but instead explained
that Miles s holding was intended to be narrow and fix an issue that had
developed in the wrongful death line of cases.50 The Jones Act and Death
on the High Seas Act51 preempted the general maritime rule that denied
an recover for wrongful death b creating a remedy for wrongful death
on the high seas or in territorial waters.52 Miles was intended to create
uniformity between the statutes and the general maritime law remedies

companionship, comfort, and protection. Brief for Respondent at 6, Dutra Grp. v. Batterton, __ U.S.
__, 139 S. Ct. 2282 (2019) (No. 18-266).
45. Miles, 498 U.S. at 21, 37.
46. The Jones Act provides a statutory cause of action against the seaman s employer if the seaman
suffers injuries or dies due to the negligence of their employer, the vessel owner, or crew members.
See Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 441 (2001).
47. Miles, 498 U.S. at 36.
48. See id. at 37; Batterton, 139 S. Ct. at 2286.
49. David W. Robertson, Punitive Damages in U.S. Maritime Law: Miles, Baker, and Townsend,
70 LA. L. REV. 463, 466 67 (2010). It is worth noting that Professor Robertson represented Batterton
in Dutra Group. v. Batterton.
This ultimately resulted in a circuit split on whether punitive damages were available in
maintenance and cure claims, which was resolved by the Supreme Court in Atlantic Sounding Co. v.
Townsend.
The ancient duty of maintenance and cure concerns the vessel owner s obligation to provide food,
lodging, and medical services to a seaman injured while serving the ship. Lewis, 531 U.S. at 441.
See generally Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 527 28 (1938). Maintenance includes
food and lodging at the ship s expense, and cure refers to medical treatment. Atl. Sounding Co. v.
Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 413 (2009). A separate circuit split on whether punitive damages are
available in unseaworthiness claims was resolved by the Supreme Court in Batterton. Batterton, 139
S. Ct. at 2275.
50. Atl. Sounding, 557 U.S. at 419.
51. Unlike the Jones Act, which only provides a wrongful death cause of action for personal
representatives of seamen, the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) provides a wrongful death cause
of action for personal representatives of anyone killed on the high seas. See Miles, 498 U.S. at 23 24.
52. Atl. Sounding, 557 U.S. at 419.
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available in wrongful death cases.53 Therefore, it made sense in Miles to
exercise complete deference and look to statutes to determine the
remedies available under the common-law wrongful-death action. 54
Miles is an example of complete deference because Congress was silent
on unseaworthiness claims, although the Court declined to further develop
the law.
The Atlantic Sounding Court also firmly declared that damages do not
have to be narrowed to the lowest common denominator approved by
Congress in traditional general maritime law causes of action.55 If
Congress is silent on a general maritime law cause of action, the Court
declared it would refuse to attribute words to Congress that it has not
written. 56 Instead of deferring to a congressional act that was not directly
on point, the Court chose to declare that punitive damages were
permissible in the claim at issue.57
In Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,58 decided in 2008, Justice Stevens
highlighted that the primary evidence the Court should consider in
deciding to permit an admiralty remedy is whether Congress had
affirmativel chosen not to restrict the availability of a particular
remed . 59 He stated that if there was such evidence, the Court should
exercise judicial restraint in denying a remedy unless some other special
justification existed.60 Looking to prior precedent, he stressed the Court
should adhere to the principle that it better becomes the humane and
liberal character of proceedings in admiralty to give than to withhold the
remedy, when not required to withhold it by established and inflexible
rules. 61 This principle is consistently expressed throughout admiralty
53. See Miles, 498 U.S. at 26.
54. Atl. Sounding, 557 U.S. at 420.
55. Id. at 424.
56. Id.
57. Id. For information about the maintenance and cure cause of action, see infra section I.B.
58. 554 U.S. 471 (2008).
59. Id. at 516 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis in original).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 522 (first quoting Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 387 (1970); and
then quoting The Sea Gull, 21 F. Cas. 909, 910 (C.C. Md. 1865) (No. 12,578)). Justice Harlan, writing
for the majority in Moragne, supported this principle with abundant case citations to other federal
maritime cases that had reached the same result using similar reasoning. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 387
88 (first citing The Columbia, 27 F. 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1886); then citing The Manhasset, 18 F. 918 (E.D.
Va. 1884); then citing The E.B. Ward, Jr., 17 F. 456 (C.C.E.D. La. 1883); then citing The Garland, 5
F. 924 (E.D. Mich. 1881); then citing Holmes v. O. & C.R. Co., 5 F. 75 (D. Or. 1880); then citing
The Towanda, 24 F. Cas. 74 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1877) (No. 14,109); then citing Plummer v. Webb, 19 F.
Cas. 894 (D. Me. 1825) (No. 11,234); and then citing Hollyday v. The David Reeves, 12 F. Cas. 386
(D. Md. 1879) (No. 6,625)).
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opinions. Thus, if there is no evidence that Congress has sought to restrict
a remedy, and such remed does not conflict with Congress s pursuit of
uniformit in the exercise of admiralt jurisdiction, then such a remed
should be permitted.62
As shown in the Supreme Court cases described above, there is a wide
range of views on what the appropriate power delegation should be
between Congress and the judiciary.63 On one end of the spectrum is
extreme deference-to-legislature, 64 or complete deference, which
includes the majority opinion in Miles.65 On the other end of the spectrum
lies extreme judicial-dominance. 66 Representative of this end is Judge
John R. Brown s criticism of the Miles Court, which asserts that the Court
abandoned its Constitutional dut of enunciating maritime law. 67 Judge
Brown went on to describe admiralty judges as followers rather
than leaders.68
B.

Remedies Available to Seamen

Seamen, due to their exposure to the perils of the sea, have a trilog
of heightened legal protections available to them that can be brought
simultaneously and provides recovery in the event of injury or illness.69
The two general maritime law causes of action are maintenance and cure
and unseaworthiness.70 The statutory cause of action for negligence arises
under the Jones Act.71 The trilog of seamen s remedies has been
universall recogni ed as . . . growing out of the status of the seaman and
[their] peculiar relationship to the vessel, and as a feature of the maritime
law compensating or offsetting the special hazards and disadvantages to
which the who go down to sea in ships are subjected. 72

62. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 26 (1990).
63. DAVID W. ROBERTSON ET AL., ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW IN THE UNITED STATES:
CASES AND MATERIALS 106 07 (3d ed. 2015).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 107.
68. Id.
69. Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 354 (1995).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. (first quoting McDermott Int l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 354 (1991); and then quoting
Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 104 (1946) (Stone, C.J., dissenting)).
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The Ancient Duty of Maintenance and Cure

The ancient duty73 of maintenance and cure concerns the vessel
owner s obligation to provide food, lodging, and medical services to a
seaman injured while serving the ship. 74 Serving the ship has been
interpreted to include injuries sustained while seamen are departing on
or returning from shore leave [even] though [they have] at the time no
dut to perform for the ship 75 and injuries received during the period of
relaxation while on shore. 76 Similar to a worker s compensation no-fault
s stem, this contractual dut does not rest upon negligence or culpability
on the part of the owner or master . . . nor is it restricted to those cases
where the seaman s emplo ment is the cause of the injur or illness. 77
This duty extends until the seaman reaches the maximum cure possible.78
If the employer does not provide the maintenance and cure owed, they are
liable for any compensatory damages (e.g., enhancement of the injury,
costs of finding alternative medical care, pain and suffering) proximately
resulting from the emplo er s failure to pa . 79 Pursuant to the Supreme
Court s decision in Atlantic Sounding, an employer can also be subject to
punitive damages if their failure to provide maintenance and cure reaches
an especially negligent and blameworthy level.80
2.

A Sea a Re ed for Injuries Sustained Due to the
Unseaworthiness of the Vessel

An unseaworthiness claim stems from a seaman s injuries caused b a
vessel owner s failure to furnish a vessel and appurtenances reasonabl

73. Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 527 (1938).
74. Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 441 (2001). See generally Calmar S.S.
Corp., 303 U.S. at 527 28. [M]aintenance includes food and lodging at the expense of their ship,
and cure refers to medical treatment. Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 413 (2009).
75. Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523, 529 (1951) (referencing the Court s interpretation of
in service of the ship in Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 733 34 (1943)).
76. Id. at 530.
77. Calmar S.S. Corp., 303 U.S. at 527 28 (first citing Cortes v. Balt. Insular Line, 287 U.S. 367,
371 (1932); then citing The City of Alexandria, 17 F. 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1883); then citing The Mars, 149
F. 729, 731 (3d Cir. 1907); then citing Sorensen v. Alaska S.S. Co., 243 F. 280 (W.D. Wash. 1917),
aff d, 247 F. 294 (9th Cir. 1918); then citing Brown v. The Bradish Johnson, 4 F. Cas. 356 (C.C.D.
La. 1873) (No. 1,992); and then citing The Wensleydale, 41 F. 829, 831 (E.D.N.Y. 1890)).
78. Dutra Grp. v. Batterton, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2275, 2288 n.2 (2019) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(citing 2 ROBERT FORCE & MARTIN J. NORRIS, THE LAW OF SEAMEN § 26:1, ¶ 4 (5th ed. 2003)).
79. Ethan Kerstein, Navigating Still-Murky Waters: The Search for Punitive Damages in an Injured
Seaman s Unseaworthiness Action, 97 TEX. L. REV. 673, 679 (2019).
80. See Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 424 (2009).

Smith (Do Not Delete)

2020]

10/4/2020 12:05 PM

THE ABANDONED WARDS OF ADMIRALTY

1575

fit for their intended use. 81 A vessel could be deemed unseaworthy due
to a number of conditions, such as: defective gear, insufficient crew size
or training, appurtenances in disrepair, or improper stowage or loading of
cargo.82 Seaworthiness is an absolute, non-delegable duty owed by the
vessel s owner to the seaman.83 However, the Supreme Court has
explained that seaworthiness is not a standard of perfection the ship is
not expected to be able to weather all storms.84 Rather, it requires the
vessel [be] reasonabl suitable for her intended service. 85 The Court has
consistentl recogni ed this dut as completel independent of [the
owner s] dut under the Jones Act to exercise reasonable care. 86
3.

T e J e Ac Ca e f Ac
Employer

f

Neg ge ce Aga

a Sea a

The Jones Act was enacted by Congress to fill a gap a seaman could
pursue a cause of action against the vessel owner for injuries caused by
the vessel s unseaworthiness but could not pursue a cause of action for
injuries caused by negligent acts of the master or other crew members.87
The Jones Act provides a statutor cause of action against the seaman s
employer if the seaman suffers injuries or dies due to the negligence of
their employer, the vessel owner, or crew members.88
Under the Jones Act, seamen, or their personal representatives, may
bring civil actions against their employers and are given the right to a jury
trial.89 The scope of a civil action is defined b reference to the federal
laws regulating recover for personal injur to, or death of, a railwa
emplo ee. Congress thus incorporated the Federal Emplo ers Liabilit

81. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960).
82. See Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494, 499 (1971).
83. See Mitchell, 362 U.S. at 549.
84. See id. at 550.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 549 (first citing Pope & Talbot, Inc., v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953); then citing Alaska
S.S. Co. v. Petterson, 347 U.S. 396 (1953); then citing Rogers v. U.S. Lines, 347 U.S. 984 (1954);
then citing Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336 (1955); then citing Crumady v. The J. H.
Fisser, 358 U.S. 423 (1959); and then citing United N.Y. & N.J. Sandy Hook Pilots Ass n v. Halecki,
358 U.S. 613 (1959)).
87. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 173 (1903). Congress enacted the Jones Act primarily to overrule
The Osceola, . . . in which this Court prohibited a seaman or his family from recovering for injuries
or death suffered due to his emplo ers negligence. Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404,
415 (2009).
88. Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 441 (2001).
89. 46 U.S.C. § 30104.

Smith (Do Not Delete)

1576

10/4/2020 12:05 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:1565

Act ( FELA ). 90 Notably, FELA does not limit damages, permitting
injured railroad workers to recover pecuniary and non-pecuniary
damages.91 The Court has consistently held that the Jones Act preserves
seamen s general maritime law causes of action of maintenance and cure
and unseaworthiness.92
4.

Differences Between Unseaworthiness and Jones Act Claims

There are important differences between unseaworthiness and Jones
Act negligence claims, and the Court has painstakingl and repeatedl
emphasized the distinction.93 An unseaworthiness claim rests on the
condition of the vessel it does not matter if an owner was negligent in
causing that condition: they are still liable for any injuries caused by the
vessel s unseaworthiness.94 Thus, liabilit based upon unseaworthiness
is wholl distinct from liabilit based upon negligence. 95 Furthermore,
unseaworthiness claims require the plaintiff to establish proximate
causation but Jones Act negligence claims have a lower burden of
causation.96 However, this is counterbalanced b the fact that [i]t is
generally easier to prove a deficiency in the vessel than that the employer
was negligent. 97
Another difference lies in the defendant: a proper Jones Act defendant
is the seaman s emplo er, while an unseaworthiness action defendant is
the vessel owner or operator.98 Even though the owner and employer may
be one and the same, that is not always the case.99 Where the owner and
90. Brief for Respondent, supra note 44, at 4 (citation omitted).
91. Id.
92. See Atl. Sounding, 557 U.S. at 416. Because the then-accepted remedies for injured seamen
arose from general maritime law . . . it necessarily follows that Congress was envisioning the
continued availability of those common-law causes of action. Id.; see also McAllister v. Magnolia
Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221, 222 n.2, 224 (1958).
93. See Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494, 500 (1971). A major burden of the
Court s decisions spelling out the nature and scope of the cause of action for unseaworthiness has
been insistence upon the point that it is a remedy separate from, independent of, and additional to
other claims against the shipowner, whether created b statute or under general maritime law. Id. at
498.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Miller v. Am. President Lines, Ltd., 989 F.2d 1450, 1463 (6th Cir. 1993).
97. ROBERTSON ET AL., supra note 63, at 185 (citing Perkins v. Am. Elec. Power Fuel Supply, 246
F.3d 593 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that a towboat deckhand injured by a defective tool had failed to
prove Jones Act negligence but was nevertheless entitled to recover for unseaworthiness)).
98. Mahramas v. Am. Exp. Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 475 F.2d 165, 169 (2d Cir. 1973).
99. See, e.g., id. (concluding an injured seaman was an employee of House of Albert assigned to
work aboard the S.S. INDEPENDENCE, a vessel owned by American Export Isbandtsen Lines).
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employer are not the same, a defendant may only bring an
unseaworthiness claim against the vessel owner and a Jones Act claim
against the employer.
C.

The History of Seamen as the Wards of Admiralty

Since the nineteenth century seamen have been considered
emphaticall the wards of [] admiralt 100 and alwa s received a special
solicitude for [their] welfare. 101 Justice Story was the first to coin seamen
as the wards of admiralty in 1823, stating that the should be treated in
the same manner, as courts of equity are accustomed to treat young heirs,
dealing with their expectancies, [and] wards with their guardians. 102
The were afforded these remedies because, [a]t the time, seamen led
miserable lives. 103 Chief Justice Stone emphasized the notion:
They are exposed to the perils of the sea and all the risks of
unseaworthiness, with little opportunity to avoid those dangers or
to discover and protect themselves from them or to prove who is
responsible for the unseaworthiness causing the injury. For these
reasons the seaman has been given a special status in the maritime
law as the ward of the admiralty, entitled to special protection of
the law not extended to land employees.104
Courts often took on this responsibility for seamen, who they felt
required special protection against the effects of the superior skill and
100. Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480, 485 (C.C. Me. 1823) (No. 6,047).
101. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 36 (1990); Dutra Grp. v. Batterton, __ U.S. __, 139
S. Ct. 2275, 2279 (2019). One fascinating case example is:
The Court s famous ice cream scooper case part of the Court s late 1950s befuddlement is
illustrative. In Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., a Jones Act case, the controversy
focused on the sufficiency of an ice cream scooper in the galley of a merchant ship. The plaintiff,
a baker, was trying to serve ice cream with a standard ice cream scooper. Because the ice cream
was frozen hard, however, an ice cream chipper tool would have been useful, but it was not
supplied. Rather than allowing the ice cream to soften, the baker used a butcher knife to chip out
ice cream and he cut off two of his fingers in the process. The trial court entered judgment for
the seaman based on a jury verdict. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed, explaining that because [the knife] was never designed for or intended to be used as
a dagger or ice pick for chipping fro en ice cream, it was not within the realm of reasonable
foreseeabilit that the baker would use the knife to chip ice cream. The Supreme Court reversed
and directed entry of judgment for the seaman. The Court explained that the scoop with which
[the baker] had been furnished was totally inadequate to remove ice cream of the consistency of
that which he had to serve. The Court explained further that [i]t was not necessar that [the
vessel owner] be in a position to foresee the exact chain of circumstances which actually led to
the accident.
John E. Holloway, Judicial Activism in Maritime Cases, 43 TUL. MAR. L.J. 21, 41 42 (2018)
(footnotes omitted).
102. Harden, 11 F. Cas. at 485.
103. Batterton, 139 S. Ct. at 2279.
104. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 104 (1946) (Stone, C.J., dissenting).
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shrewdness of masters and owners of ships. 105 While this special
solicitude provided seamen with additional protections,106 it also unfairly
classified them as deficient in that full and intelligent responsibility for
their acts which is accredited to ordinar adults. 107
In 1990, the Supreme Court first expressed reluctance to regard seamen
as the wards of admiralty in Miles, where the Court denied a seamen s
mother non-pecuniary damages in a wrongful death case.108 The seaman s
estate s argument of special solicitude failed, marking a turning point in
admiralty precedent.109 The Court expressed the belief that their hands
were tied because they understood maritime tort law to be dominated by
federal statute and stated, we are not free to expand remedies at will
simply because it might work to the benefit of seamen and those
dependent upon them. 110
While much has changed with regard to the experience of working at
sea, much has also stayed the same. The ph sical risks created b natural
elements 111 are still present.112 Furthermore, the Court s description of
shipboard life from 1943 still holds true:
[T]he restrictions which accompany living aboard ship for long
periods at a time combine with the constant shuttling between
unfamiliar ports to deprive the seaman of the comforts and

105. Brown v. Lull, 4 F. Cas. 407, 409 (C.C. Mass. 1836) (No. 2,018).
106. Holloway, supra note 101, at 36 43; id. at 36 (quoting Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275,
287 (1897)).
107. Id. at 36 (quoting Robertson, 165 U.S. at 287).
108. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 36 (1991).
109. See id.
110. Id.
111. Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 727 (1943).
112. See, e.g., Matt Gutman & Matt German, HMS Bounty Survivors: Crew of Ship Sunk During
Hurricane Sandy Speak of Lost Shipmates, ABC NEWS (Nov. 6, 2012, 4:02 AM),
https://abcnews.go.com/US/hms-bounty-survivors-crew-ship-sunk-hurricanesandy/story?id=17650072 [https://perma.cc/U7JR-2GYK] (recounting the dramatic sinking of the
HMS Bounty during Hurricane Sandy in 2012); Travis Fedschun, Hurricane Lorenzo Sinks Tugboat
Carrying 14 Crew Members; At Least 1 Found Dead at Sea, 3 Rescued, FOX NEWS (Sept. 30, 2019),
https://www.foxnews.com/world/hurricane-lorenzo-bourbon-rhode-tugboast-sink-rescue-martinique
[https://perma.cc/92DS-UAM2] (detailing the sinking of a tug during Hurricane Lorenzo); Lightning
Strike Sinks Ship: 4 Dead, One Missing, STRANGE SOUNDS (Nov. 25, 2019),
https://strangesounds.org/2019/11/lightning-sinks-ship-death-missing-indonesia.html
[https://perma.cc/U82U-NRFV] (discussing the sinking of a ship after it was struck by lightning
causing the death of four sailors); Carl Prine & David Larter, Sailor Dies After Ladderwell Accident
on Board Warship, NAVY TIMES (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.navytimes.com/news/yournavy/2020/03/11/sailor-dies-after-ladderwell-accident-on-board-warship/ [https://perma.cc/3AZZUBUM] (describing the death of a Navy sailor after he fell down a ladderwell while underway and
fractured his skull).

Smith (Do Not Delete)

2020]

10/4/2020 12:05 PM

THE ABANDONED WARDS OF ADMIRALTY

1579

opportunities for leisure, essential for living and working, that
accompan most land occupations. Furthermore, the seaman s
unusual subjection to authority adds the weight of what would be
involuntary servitude for others to these extraordinary hazards
and limitations of ship life . . . . Unlike men employed in service
on land, the seaman, when he finishes his da s work, is neither
relieved of obligations to his employer nor wholly free to dispose
of his leisure as he sees fit. Of necessity, during the voyage he
must eat, drink, lodge and divert himself within the confines of
the ship. In short, during the period of his tenure the vessel is not
merely his place of employment; it is the framework of his
existence.113
The polic justifications for considering seamen the wards of admiralt
are still present because of the physical risks seamen are subjected to at
sea, the heavy weight of authority seamen must tolerate, and the
restrictions shipboard life imposes on the way seamen live.
Despite conditions for seamen remaining largely the same, it is unclear
in toda s courts when seamen are warranted special solicitude.114 Often,
special solicitude is entirely ignored in cases that a seaman loses; in cases
where a seaman wins, however, this principle is heavily relied upon.115
John Holloway, a critic of this unfair application, has called the doctrine
of special solicitude a tool for result-oriented (i.e., activist) judging. 116
II.

A COMPARISON OF BATTERTON AND TABINGO

This Part compares the courts reasoning in Dutra Group v. Batterton
and Tabingo v. American Triumph LLC, which ultimately led them to
opposite conclusions about the availability of punitive damages in
unseaworthiness actions. The two cases relied on different Supreme Court
precedents and disagreed on whether the policy arguments were centered
on seamen or their employers. In Tabingo, the Washington State Supreme
Court cited to Atlantic Sounding to hold that a plaintiff may recover
punitive damages on an unseaworthiness claim.117 However, this case was
overruled by Batterton, where the Supreme Court relied on Miles to hold
that a plaintiff may not recover punitive damages on an unseaworthiness

113. Aguilar, 318 U.S. at 731 32.
114. See Holloway, supra note 101, at 36 43.
115. See id. (finding that the Supreme Court had ruled in favor of the maritime worker in twentyone of the twenty-three cases in which it had relied upon the doctrine of special solicitude).
116. Id. at 38.
117. Tabingo v. Am. Triumph LLC, 188 Wash. 2d 41, 43, 391 P.3d 434, 436 (2017).
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claim.118 This Part compares the opposing doctrinal and policy reasons
that led these courts to opposite conclusions on the availability of punitive
damages in unseaworthiness claims.
A.

Tabingo Majority Permits Punitive Damages in Unseaworthiness
Actions

In Tabingo v. American Triumph LLC, Allan Tabingo was a seaman
who worked on an American Seafoods fishing trawler.119 His hand was
injured when a hatch closed on it due to a mechanical malfunction.120
Tabingo brought an unseaworthiness claim seeking both general and
punitive damages.121 The issue presented was whether a seaman could
recover punitive damages in an unseaworthiness claim.122 American
Seafoods argued that punitive damages are prohibited under the Jones
Act s provision for maritime negligence actions, and because the
unseaworthiness claim was joined with a Jones Act negligence claim,
punitive damages are barred for the unseaworthiness claim as well. 123
The Washington State Supreme Court s reasoning in Tabingo was
simple. Because the United States Supreme Court had allowed punitive
damages in Atlantic Sounding for a maintenance and cure claim, the
Tabingo Court determined that it would follow precedent to permit
punitive damages in an unseaworthiness claim.124 The Court noted that
not only does the Jones Act evince[] no general hostilit to recover
under maritime law, . . . the act does not disturb seamen s general
maritime claims for injuries resulting from unseaworthiness either.125
The Tabingo Court reasoned that the Jones Act does not explicitly
preclude punitive damages in unseaworthiness claims because
118. Dutra Grp. v. Batterton, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2275, 2278 (2019). This decision is striking,
given that Washington is one of the few states that does not regularly award punitive damages.
Tabingo, 188 Wash. 2d at 52, 391 P.3d at 440.
119. Tabingo, 188 Wash. 2d at 43, 391 P.3d at 436.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 44 45, 391 P.3d at 436 37.
123. Id. at 44 45, 391 P.3d at 436.
124. Id. at 43, 391 P.3d at 436 ( The Court held that because both the claim and the damages were
historically available at common law and because Congress had shown no intent to limit recovery of
punitive damages, those damages were available. Here, we follow the United States Supreme Court s
rationale and find that, like maintenance and cure, punitive damages are available for a general
maritime unseaworthiness claim. ). It is worth noting that the Washington State Supreme Court used
Townsend to refer to Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend, whereas the U.S. Supreme Court used
Atlantic Sounding.
125. Id. at 50 51, 391 P.3d at 439.
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unseaworthiness claims predated Jones Act claims.126 The majority then
determined that Atlantic Sounding was the applicable Supreme Court
precedent not Miles.127 The Tabingo Court explained Miles was not
controlling because it should not be read to limit seamen s common law
claims.128 According to the Court, the claim at issue in Miles was statutory
in nature, as opposed to the unseaworthiness claim at issue in this case.129
Furthermore, the Atlantic Sounding Court determined that Miles was of
limited applicabilit in the general maritime context. 130 This is because
Miles did not even address general maritime claims.131 For all of these
reasons, the Tabingo Court concluded Miles was not on point.132
The Court next addressed the conundrum of Washington State s
general disapproval of punitive damages.133 Even though Washington
does not typically allow punitive damages for egregious conduct,134
federal maritime law governs admiralty cases brought in state court.135
Thus, Washington s general disallowance of punitive damages was not
relevant because the Court was interpreting federal law, not Washington
State law.136
Finally, the Court highlighted the policy argument that seamen
traditionally have been afforded special protection as the wards of
admiralty.137 The Court reasoned that allowing punitive damages would
be consistent with protecting seamen because punitive damages are meant
to punish and deter defendants rather than reward plaintiffs.138 The need
for special protection was apparent in Tabingo s case because his

126. See id. at 47, 391 P.3d at 438.
127. Id. at 48 50, 391 P.3d at 438 39.
128. Id. at 50 51, 391 P.3d at 439.
129. Id. at 50, 391 P.3d at 439.
130. Id. at 51, 391 P.3d at 439.
131. Id.
132. See id. at 51, 391 P.3d at 439.
133. Id. at 52, 391 P.3d at 440. Washington is one of only a few states that does not provide
generall for punitive damages for particularl egregious conduct. McKee v. AT&T Corp., 164
Wash. 2d 372, 401, 191 P.3d 845, 860 (2008) (citing Dailey v. N. Coast Life Ins. Co., 129 Wash. 2d
572, 575, 919 P.2d 589, 590 91 (1996)).
134. Tabingo, 188 Wash. 2d at 52, 391 P.3d at 440 (citing Dailey, 129 Wash. 2d at 575, 919 P.2d
at 589).
135. Id. at 52 53, 391 P.3d at 440 (citing Clausen v. Icicle Seafoods, Inc., 174 Wash. 2d 70, 76,
272 P.3d 827, 831 (2012)).
136. See id.
137. See id. at 53, 391 P.3d at 440.
138. See id. at 53 54, 391 P.3d at 440 41 (citing Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 492
93 (2008)).
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employer had allegedly allowed an unseaworthy vessel to sail for two
years without fixing it.139 Therefore, awarding the employer punitive
damages would serve as an example for other ship owners. 140 Two years
later, the United States Supreme Court took up a case incredibly similar
to Tabingo called Dutra Group v. Batterton.141
B.

Batterton Majority Rejects Punitive Damages in Unseaworthiness
Actions

In Dutra Group v. Batterton, Christopher Batterton was a seaman who
worked as a deckhand on a Dutra Group vessel.142 His hand was injured
when a hatch blew open due to pressuri ed air inside a ship s
compartment.143 Batterton brought a claim of unseaworthiness seeking
both general and punitive damages.144 Dutra Group sought to dismiss
Batterton s claim for punitive damages because the interpreted Miles as
holding that punitive damages are not available for unseaworthiness
claims.145 The Ninth Circuit held that punitive damages are available for
unseaworthiness claims, which reaffirmed a Circuit split.146 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari.147 The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit s decision and held that punitive damages are unavailable in
unseaworthiness claims.148
1.

The Historical Availability of Punitive Damages in
Unseaworthiness Claims

Justice Alito, writing for the majority, focused on a historical approach
that showed an absence of punitive damage awards in unseaworthiness
cases.149 He concluded that [t]he lack of punitive damages in traditional
maritime law [unseaworthiness] cases is practicall dispositive. 150 The
majorit claimed that Batterton failed to present an decisions from the
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

See id. at 53, 391 P.3d at 441.
Id. at 53 54, 391 P.3d at 441.
Dutra Grp. v. Batterton, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2275 (2019).
Id. at 2282.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 2282 85.
Id. at 2282 83.
Id.
Id. at 2287.
See id. at 2284.
Id.
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formative years of the personal injury unseaworthiness claim in which
exemplar damages were awarded. 151 Batterton endeavored to reconcile
the tension between the precedents set by Miles and Atlantic Sounding by
concluding that there was a historical record of punitive damage awards
in the maintenance and cure context, but not in the
unseaworthiness context.152
However, this historical record that Justice Alito painted is in debate.
Professor Costabel, who teaches Admiralty Law at the St. Thomas
University School of Law, found 133 cases that permitted punitive
damages in unseaworthiness actions and many more that had dicta
supporting punitive damages.153 Justice Ginsberg, writing in dissent, also
pointed to the long history of punitive damages in general maritime law
at large.154
The dissent further stressed that even if there is not a strong record of
punitive damages in unseaworthiness claims, punitive damages are
normally available in maritime cases.155 As Justice Ginsburg pointed out,
this means that the Court toda holds that unseaworthiness claims are an
exception to that general rule. 156 Furthermore, the dissent noted that
evidence that punitive damages were available was not central to the
Atlantic Sounding decision; thus, this factor should be similarly assessed
in Batterton s case.157 The dissent underlined that Atlantic Sounding only
invoked historical evidence to show that, in the absence of a showing that
punitive damages were unavailable for a given claim, the common law
rule should be applied.158
2.

Whether Congress Intended to Limit Remedies in Unseaworthiness
Actions
Preference for congressional intervention in maritime law was central

151. Id.
152. See id. at 2278.
153. Costabel, supra note 1, at 317.
154. See Batterton, 139 S. Ct. at 2289 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 2288 (citing Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008)).
156. Id. (citing Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990)).
157. Id. at 2291 ( Contrar to the Court s assertion, evidence of the availabilit of punitive
damages for maintenance and cure was not central to our decision in Atlantic Sounding . . . [A]
search for cases in which punitive damages were awarded for the willful denial of maintenance and
cure . . . ields ver little. (quoting Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 430 (2009)
(Alito, J., dissenting))).
158. See id. at 2278 79, 2284, 2286 (majority opinion).
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to the majorit s decision in Batterton.159 The Court conceded that the
Admiralty Clause permits federal courts to proceed as common law
courts, but ultimatel concluded that maritime law is no longer solel the
province of the Federal Judiciar . Congress and the States have legislated
extensivel in these areas. 160 Thus, unlike its decision in Atlantic
Sounding, the Court deferred to Congress s statutor scheme as a basis for
not enunciating principles of general maritime law.161 The dissent
countered that Atlantic Sounding held that general maritime law remedies
are not outright confined by the Jones Act or Death on the High Seas Act
remedies.162 The Jones Act was meant to enlarge the protections of
seamen, not to narrow them.163 Even Miles, the case the majority relied on
to reach its holding, stated that the Jones Act, d[id] not disturb seamen s
general maritime claims for injuries resulting from unseaworthiness. 164
Congress did not intend to limit historical remedies, such as punitive
damages, by enacting the Jones Act.165
The Batterton majority further concluded that seamen should not be
permitted to recover twice for a single legal wrong committed by their
employers, since unseaworthiness and Jones Act claims are so similar.166
The Court described the significant overlap between the two causes of
action 167 and quoted a treatise that described the two as alternative
grounds of recover for a single cause of action. 168 Therefore, because
Congress has disallowed punitive damages in Jones Act claims, they must
have intended to disallow punitive damages in unseaworthiness claims as
well.169 The dissent articulated the difference between an unseaworthiness
action and a Jones Act negligence action.170 Furthermore, the dissent

159. See id. at 2290 93 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 2278 (quoting Miles, 498 U.S. at 27).
161. See id. at 2286 (majority opinion).
162. See id. at 2290 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 2291 (quoting The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110, 123 (1936)).
164. Id. at 2292 (quoting Miles, 498 U.S. at 29).
165. Id. at 2290.
166. Id. at 2282 (majority opinion).
167. Id.
168. Id. (quoting 2 ROBERT FORCE & MARTIN J. NORRIS, THE LAW OF SEAMEN § 30:90, ¶ 369 (5th
ed. 2003)).
169. See id. at 2282, 2284 86 ( [W]e have more recentl observed that the Jones Act limits
recover to pecuniar loss. . . . . Looking to FELA and these decisions, the Federal Courts of Appeals
have uniformly held that punitive damages are not available under the Jones Act. (citations omitted)).
170. Id. at 2290 93 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) ( Unseaworthiness related to the structure of the
ship and the adequac of [its] equipment and furnishings, while negligence concerned the direction
and control of operations aboard ship. (quoting G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 6

Smith (Do Not Delete)

2020]

10/4/2020 12:05 PM

THE ABANDONED WARDS OF ADMIRALTY

1585

focused on the fact that [t]here is . . . no tension between preventing
double recovery of compensatory damages and allowing the recovery,
once, of punitive damages. 171
3.

Policy Grounds for Permitting or Denying Punitive Damages in
Unseaworthiness Claims

The majority considered whether policy grounds should compel the
availability of punitive damages for unseaworthiness claims.172 The Court
concluded that because non-compensatory damages are not part of the
civil-code tradition, allowing punitive damages would place American
shippers at a significant competitive disadvantage and discourage foreignowned vessels from hiring American seamen.173 Ultimately, the majority
stated that [t]his would frustrate another fundamental interest served b
federal maritime jurisdiction: the protection of maritime commerce. 174
This argument seemed meritless to the dissent for two reasons. First,
punitive damages had been available in maintenance and cure actions for
a decade and excessive claims have not overwhelmed the courts.175
Second, punitive damages were available in unseaworthiness cases in
some circuit courts and again, no influx of cases occurred.176
The majority then considered from a policy standpoint, whether
seamen still warrant special solicitude as the wards of admiralty.177 The
Court found the did not, calling the doctrine paternalistic and impl ing
it was outdated.178 Further, the majorit stated the doctrine was never a
commandment. 179 Strikingl , the majorit asserted that while sailors
today face hardships not encountered by those who work on land, neither
3, 277 (2d ed. 1975))).
171. Id. at 2293.
172. See id. at 2285 87 (majority opinion).
173. Id. at 2287 (first citing Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 497 (2008); and then
citing John Y. Gotanda, Punitive Damages: A Comparative Analysis, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT L L.
391, 396 n.24 (2004) (listing civil-law nations that restrict private plaintiffs to compensatory
damages)).
174. Id. (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v.
Kirby, 543 U.S. 14, 25 (2004)).
175. Id. at 2293 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (citing Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404
(2009)).
176. Id. (first citing Self v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 832 F.2d 1540, 1550 (11th Cir. 1987),
abrogated by Batterton, 139 S. Ct. 2282; and then citing Evich v. Morris, 819 F.2d 256, 258 (9th Cir.
1987), abrogated by Batterton, 139 S. Ct. 2282.
177. See id. at 2287 (majority opinion).
178. See id.
179. Id.
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are they as isolated nor as dependent on the master as their predecessors
from the age of sail. 180 Overall, the Court determined that special
solicitude should only play a small role in contemporary maritime law,
and therefore, it does not outweigh the aforementioned reasons for
denying punitive damages in unseaworthiness actions.181
Conversely, the dissent focused on seamen instead of their
employers.182 Rather than abandon the long history of considering seamen
the wards of admiralty, the dissent expressed that giving seamen special
solicitude is necessary because the unique dangers that seamen face in
service of the ship are still present.183 Furthermore, punitive damages are
meant to deter and punish wrongdoers, not to reward plaintiffs.184 Thus,
the question is not whether seamen deserve special solicitude, but rather
whether punitive damages are appropriate to deter ship owners from
wanton and willful misconduct in the maintenance of their vessels.
Finally, the majority argued that allowing punitive damages in
unseaworthiness actions would create a bizarre disparity that would
disrupt Miles s uniformity principle, which established that if a statute did
not allow particular damages, then a similar general maritime law claim
could not allow them.185 On the other hand, the dissent concluded that no
such inconsistency existed in allowing seamen to recover punitive
damages from a shipowner because [e]xposure to such damages helps to
deter wrongdoing, particularl when malfeasance is hard to detect. 186
Memorabl , the dissent flipped the script on the majorit b stating, [i]f
there is an bi arre disparit[ ], it is the one the Court toda creates:
Punitive damages are available for willful and wanton breach of the duty
to provide maintenance and cure, but not for similarly culpable breaches
of the dut to provide a seaworth vessel. 187
Ultimately, the Batterton majority determined that punitive damages
should not be available in unseaworthiness actions primarily for three
reasons. First, there was an historical record of punitive damage awards
in the maintenance and cure context, but not in the unseaworthiness
180. Id.
181. See id.
182. See id. at 2293 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
183. See id. (quoting Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480, 483 (C.C.D. Me. 1823) (No. 6,047) (Story,
J.)).
184. Id. at 2292 93 (citing Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 492 (2008)).
185. See id. at 2287 (majority opinion); Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 26 27, 37
(1990).
186. Batterton, 139 S. Ct. at 2293 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (quoting Exxon, 554 U.S. at 494).
187. Id.
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context.188 Second, the Court pointed to the fact that Congress had
extensively legislated in this area, and therefore, it was not appropriate for
the Court to allow punitive damages.189 And third, the majority believed
policy reasons weighed in favor of not permitting punitive damages.190
III. THE TABINGO COURT S CONCLUSION IS STRONGER
FROM BOTH DOCTRINAL AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES
Batterton solidified two significant shifts in U.S. Supreme Court
admiralt decision making. First, it confirmed the Supreme Court s
unwillingness to use its explicit grant of admiralty jurisdiction: in this
case, by not allowing an admiralty remedy because it was not expressly
provided for by Congress. Second, the Supreme Court shifted from
previously considering seamen the wards of admiralty to no longer
affording them this special protection.191
The Tabingo Court s argument that punitive damages should be
permissible in unseaworthiness claims is sounder from both policy and
doctrinal standpoints. From a policy standpoint, it is more congruous with
the principle of special solicitude for seamen that the Court has recognized
since 1823. Further, it is preferable doctrinally because maritime law has
traditionally permitted punitive damages in admiralty cases. Thus, the
principle the Batterton Court should have adhered to was that if there is
no evidence Congress has sought to restrict a remedy, and such remedy
does not conflict with Congress s pursuit of uniformit in the exercise of
admiralt jurisdiction, then such a remedy should be permitted.192

188. Id. at 2283 (majority opinion).
189. Id. at 2278.
190. See id. at 2287.
191. Scholars have feared these shifts for decades. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 39, at 249 (arguing
the Supreme Court justices had abandoned their role as admiralty judges and had become followers
rather than leaders by refusing to enunciate maritime law and always looking to Congress);
Handford, supra note 41, at 275 (arguing the Supreme Court should begin its analysis when faced
with an opportunit to create law with the assumption that the Supreme Court is the primary
proponent of federal admiralt law ); Michael A. Orlando & Kyle D. Giacco, Admiralty and Maritime
Law: The Pitch, Roll, and Yaw of the (U)SS Supreme Court, 28 TORT & INS. L.J. 137, 153 (1993)
(arguing that while the Supreme Court had in some ways made it easier to qualify for seaman status,
the Court had also made it less desirable to be a seaman ).
192. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 26 (1990).
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The Batterton Dec
S e ed A
ca
f Miles Fails to
Respect the Doctrinal Roots of Distinct Causes of Action and
Available Remedies

The Batterton majorit s contention that unseaworthiness should be
treated differently than maintenance and cure because of a lack of
historical precedent is unfounded. As previously noted, Professor
Costabel found 133 cases that permitted punitive damages in
unseaworthiness actions and many more that had dicta supporting
punitive damages.193 Furthermore, historical examples of punitive
damages in maintenance and cure cases were not central to the Court s
decision in Atlantic Sounding.194
The Batterton majorit s reliance on Miles skews its analysis entirely.
The wrongful death action at issue in Miles was not an action under
general maritime law.195 Miles s holding was intended to be narrow and
fix an issue that had developed in the wrongful death line of cases.196
Batterton, on the other hand, is more akin to Atlantic Sounding, where the
Court decided whether punitive damages were permissible under a
general maritime law cause of action.197 Therefore, it would have been
more doctrinally sound for the Court to follow Atlantic Sounding s
precedent, as the Tabingo Court did.
The Tabingo Court gave appropriate precedential weight to Atlantic
Sounding by adhering to its analysis of Miles. While Miles is still good
law, it has limited applicabilit in the general maritime context . . . [and]
is not universall applicable. 198 As Miles is limited to tort remedies
grounded in statute[] and unseaworthiness is not a remedy grounded in
statute, it follows that punitive damages have not been limited in
unseaworthiness actions as they were in wrongful death actions.199
Conflating the Jones Act and unseaworthiness causes of action
permitted the Batterton majority to argue that there was no difference
between the two. However, there was no historical precedent for that
conclusion prior to Batterton. Rather, in prior cases the Court had
painstakingly tried to differentiate between the two causes of action.200
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Costabel, supra note 1, at 317.
See Batterton, 139 S. Ct. at 2291 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
See Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 419 (2009).
See id.
See id. at 422 24.
Tabingo v. Am. Triumph LLC, 188 Wash. 2d 41, 51, 391 P.3d 434, 439 (2017).
Id. at 52, 391 P.3d at 440.
Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494, 500 (1971) ( To hold that this individual
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The Batterton majority also overemphasized the fact that a plaintiff should
not recover twice in compensatory damages and overlooked the fact that
punitive damages were what was at stake.201 However, the dissent pointed
out that [t]here is thus no tension between preventing double recovery of
compensatory damages and allowing the recovery, once, of
punitive damages. 202
In contrast, the Tabingo Court recognized unseaworthiness and Jones
Act negligence as separate and distinct claims.203 The Court looked to the
intent of the Jones Act and appreciated that it was meant to protect
seamen as wards of admiralty and to expand protections rather than limit
them. 204 Rather than getting hung up on the absence of historical data,
the Court concluded positivel that: (1) punitive damages have long
been available at common law, (2) the common-law tradition of punitive
damages extends to maritime claims, and (3) there is no evidence that
claims for maintenance and cure were excluded from this general
admiralt rule. 205 These conclusions led the Court to permit punitive
damages in unseaworthiness claims a decision more aligned with
previous maritime law precedent and the intent of the Jones Act.
B.

The Supreme Court Has Exhibited Unwillingness to Permit
Remedies in Admiralty that Congress Has Not Explicitly Provided

The Supreme Court s unwillingness to permit admiralt remedies for
claims that Congress has not addressed is misplaced. Unseaworthiness
actions fall under the general maritime law, which is a body of substantive
federal common law that the federal courts are authorized to develop.206
As such, the Supreme Court has the ability to develop laws pertaining to
unseaworthiness actions, including permitting admiralty remedies.
However, the Supreme Court has shown an apparent desire to defer this
power to Congress. Judge John R. Brown, the leading U.S. admiralty jurist
before his death in 1993, wrote [i]n the past fifteen ears the justices of
the Supreme Court have abandoned their [constitutional] role
act of negligence rendered the ship unseaworthy would be to subvert the fundamental distinction
between [u]nseaworthiness and negligence that we have so painstakingly and repeatedly emphasized
in our decisions. ).
201. See Dutra Grp. v. Batterton, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2275, 2282 (2019).
202. Id. at 2293 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
203. See Tabingo, 188 Wash. 2d at 47, 391 P.3d at 438.
204. Id. at 49, 391 P.3d at 439.
205. Id. at 48, 391 P.3d at 438 (quoting Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 414 15
(2009)).
206. See Kerstein, supra note 79, at 677 78.
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as admiralty judges. 207 Professor David Robertson, one of the nation s
leading authorities on admiralty law before his death, expressed fear that
the modern Court neither understands admiralty nor regards it
as important. 208
Admiralty and maritime law are of tremendous importance given
maritime shipping s enormous impact on the U.S. econom . For example,
[w]ater transportation contributed $36 billion U.S. dollars and 64
thousand jobs to the U.S. economy in 2010. 209 Even toda , 90 percent
of everything still travels as it did almost 500 years ago: b ship. 210 The
Supreme Court s unwillingness to provide remedies while acting as a
common law court sitting in admiralty solidifies a momentous shift in how
admiralty law is handed down.
The Batterton Court should have followed the well-established
admiralty principle that if there is no evidence Congress has sought to
restrict a remed , and such remed does not conflict with Congress s
pursuit of uniformit in the exercise of admiralt jurisdiction, then such
a remedy should be permitted.211 Rather than creating an anomaly
because punitive damages are now available for breaches of the duty to
provide maintenance and cure, but not for breaches of the duty to provide
a seaworthy vessel212 it would have been the more humane approach to
allow punitive damages in unseaworthiness claims. The Tabingo Court
adhered to this principle b declaring that because neither the United
States Supreme Court nor Congress has indicated that unseaworthiness
should be excluded from the general admiralt rule, punitive damages
should be allowed, just as they were permitted by the Atlantic Sounding

207. David W. Robertson, Our High Court of Admiralty and Its Sometimes Peculiar Relationship
with Congress, 55 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 491, 492 (2011) (quoting Brown, supra note 41, at 283).
208. Id.
209. Matthew Chambers & Mindy Liu, Maritime Trade and Transportation by the Numbers,
BUREAU OF TRANSP. STAT., https://www.bts.gov/archive/publications/by_the_numbers/maritime_
trade_and_transportation/index
[https://perma.cc/PSQ8-Z282]
(determining
that
water
transportation contributed $36 billion U.S. dollars and 64 thousand jobs to the U.S. ).
210. Natasha Geiling, How the Shipping Industry is the Secret Force Driving the World Economy,
SMITHSONIAN MAG., https://www.smithsonianmag.com/innovation/how-the-shipping-industry-isthe-secret-force-driving-the-world-economy-1950979/ [https://perma.cc/KKE9-8JR5]. In 2011, the
360 commercial ports of the United States took in international goods worth $1.73 trillion, or eighty
times the value of all U.S. trade in 1960. ROSE GEORGE, NINETY PERCENT OF EVERYTHING: INSIDE
SHIPPING, THE INVISIBLE INDUSTRY THAT PUTS CLOTHES ON YOUR BACK, GAS IN YOUR CAR, AND
FOOD ON YOUR PLATE 3 (2013).
211. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 26 (1990).
212. See Dutra Grp. v. Batterton, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2275, 2293 (2019) (Ginsberg, J.,
dissenting).
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Court in the maintenance and cure context.213
C.

T eC

Aba d

e

f Sea en as the Wards of Admiralty

Batterton also solidified the Supreme Court s shift from previousl
considering seamen the wards of admiralty to no longer seeing a policy
reason to protect seamen. Instead of focusing on the seamen, the Court
emphasized the burden punitive damages would put on their employers.214
However, seamen require protection as much today as they did in the
nineteenth century because the risk of exploitation and abuse,
nonpayment of wages, noncompliance with contracts, exposure to poor
diet and living conditions, and even abandonment at foreign ports 215
still exists.
Seamen work irregular hours during the day and often exceed sixty
hours per week.216 The separation from family during long voyages and
inability to escape work while at sea contributed to the finding in a recent
stud that 25% of seamen who participated in the stud suffer[ed] with
depression, anxiet and suicidal ideation. 217 Furthermore, commercial
fishing is widel regarded as one of the most dangerous jobs in the
U.S. 218 with seamen facing higher risk of fatalit , injur , and illness
than other American workers. 219 A glaring statistic is that the fatality rate
for water transportation workers is 4.7 times higher than the average rate
for other U.S. workers.220
It is ironic that the Court was unwilling to exercise its constitutional
role when it came to granting punitive damages in unseaworthiness
actions, yet it was willing to deny seamen a special protective status that
has been afforded to them by admiralty law since its inception. This irony
is compounded when considering that the Court is uncomfortable
exercising its admiralty jurisdiction but is comfortable making broad
claims about life at sea without providing evidence, such as while sailors
today face hardships not encountered by those who work on land, neither
213. See Tabingo v. Am. Triumph LLC, 188 Wash. 2d 41, 49 50, 391 P.3d 434, 439 (2017).
214. See Batterton, 139 S. Ct. at 2287.
215. Llinás Negret, supra note 4, at 34.
216. Trapped at Sea: Protecting Seafarers During COVID-19, LLOYD S REG. FOUND. (Apr. 21,
2020), https://www.lrfoundation.org.uk/en/news/protecting-seafarers-during-covid-19/
[https://perma.cc/Z87G-HGXB].
217. Id.
218. Maritime Safety and Health Studies, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/maritime/ [https://perma.cc/X4ZT-AE9B].
219. Id.
220. Id.
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are they as isolated nor as dependent on the master as their predecessors
from the age of sail. 221
Both the Batterton dissent and the Tabingo Court also point out that
whether seamen should be afforded special solicitude is not highly
relevant to this case, given that punitive damages are meant to deter
wrongdoing rather than reward the plaintiff.222 Justice Ginsburg s dissent
noted the bizarre disparity this policy decision created [p]unitive
damages are available for willful and wanton breach of the duty to provide
maintenance and cure, but not for similarly culpable breaches of the duty
to provide a seaworth vessel. 223
The Tabingo Court adhered to the general maritime law tradition of
providing seamen with special protections.224 The Court determined
allowing punitive damages in this unseaworthiness action might deter
other ship owners from displa ing reckless or malicious disregard for
their duty to operate seaworthy vessels.225 This deterrence, in turn,
benefits the seamen who work on those vessels. In contrast, the stark
implication of Batterton is that seamen will suffer from the cost benefit
analysis this creates for shipowners:
From now on, the occasional employer delinquent in paying
hospital bills will receive heavy punishment, while the occasional
shipowner supplying recklessly and outrageously an unsafe ship
that causes the death of one or more seamen will do so with
impunity, while laughing all the way to the bank, paying only the
relatively minor pecuniary damages that could be proven. The old
joke of the pre-Moragne era maintains its macabre humor. It is
still cheaper to kill them than to make them sick.226
CONCLUSION
Batterton solidified a significant shift in Supreme Court admiralty
decision making in two respects. First, it illustrated a recent unwillingness
by the Supreme Court to allow an admiralty remedy that is not explicitly
provided by Congress. Given the Constitutional authorization, the
Supreme Court is able to develop the body of law, including provision of
remedies, in regard to unseaworthiness. Therefore, the unwillingness to
221. Dutra Grp. v. Batterton, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2275, 2287 (2019).
222. See id. at 2292 93 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (citing Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S.
471, 492 (2008)); Tabingo v. Am. Triumph LLC, 188 Wash. 2d 41, 53, 391 P.3d 434, 440 41 (2017).
223. Batterton, 139 S. Ct. at 2293 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
224. See Tabingo, 188 Wash. 2d at 53 54, 391 P.3d at 440 41.
225. See id. at 53 54, 391 P.3d at 441.
226. Costabel, supra note 1, at 329 (emphasis in original).
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provide remedies while acting as a common law court sitting in admiralty
is unwarranted. Second, the Supreme Court solidified its shift in Batterton
from previously considering seamen the wards of admiralty to no longer
seeing a policy need to protect them. The Court abandoned the nearly 200year-old determination for a weak policy argument with no supporting
evidence.
The Washington State Supreme Court s decision in Tabingo that
punitive damages should be permissible in unseaworthiness claims is
far better from both policy and doctrinal standpoints. From a doctrinal
perspective, maritime law has traditionally permitted punitive damages in
admiralty cases. Therefore, it was appropriate for the Court to adhere to
the principle that it is better to allow a remedy in admiralty proceedings
so long as an inflexible rule does not prohibit it.227 From a policy
standpoint, employers do not require the same protections as seamen. Not
permitting punitive damages in unseaworthiness claims makes the costbenefit analysis simple for employers
it is . . . cheaper to kill [seamen]
than to make them sick. 228 The Supreme Court should reassess its
responsibility to develop the general maritime law and its responsibility
to seamen by permitting punitive damages in unseaworthiness claims.

227. See Exxon, 554 U.S. at 522 (first citing Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375,
387 (1970); and then citing The Sea Gull, 21 F. Cas. 909, 910 (C.C. Md. 1865) (No. 12,578)).
228. Costabel, supra note 1, at 329 (emphasis omitted).
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